Marriage Formation/Dissolution and Marital Distribution in a Two-Period Economic Model of Matching with Cooperative Bargaining by Ayse Mumcu & Ismail Saglam
©Copyright JASSS
 
Ayse Mumcu and Ismail Saglam (2008)
Marriage Formation/Dissolution and Marital Distribution in a
Two-Period Economic Model of Matching with Cooperative
Bargaining
Journal of Artificial Societies and Social Simulation vol. 11, no. 4 3
<http://jasss.soc.surrey.ac.uk/11/4/3.html>
For information about citing this article, click here
Received: 13-Sep-2007    Accepted: 08-Jun-2008    Published: 31-Oct-2008
Abstract
We study the problem of marriage formation and marital distribution in a two-period model of
matching, extending the matching with bargaining framework of Crawford and Rochford (1986).
We run simulations to find the effects of alimony rate and legal cost of divorce parameters on the
payoffs and marital status in the society.
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 Introduction
1.1
Being unmarried, married or divorced are decisions faced by every human being during his/her
lifetime with far-reaching economic implications both for individuals and for the society as a
whole. While in most societies, these decisions are taken by individuals, hence determined by
individual preferences, they are also significantly shaped by social norms that draw the boundaries
of the pool of eligible mates, civil laws that govern marital dissolution, and economic
environments that frame marriage and divorce possibilities.
1.2
In the last hundred years, the divorce rates have experienced a sharp increase.[1] The positive
welfare effects of divorce through facilitating the termination of malfunctioning marriages (e.g.
marriages involving domestic violence and child abuse) have, on average, been outweighed by
post-separation costs especially borne by women and children.[2] The rise in the divorce rates has
consequently attracted the attention of researchers in understanding and modelling the formation of
marriages and marital dissolution, and increased the awareness of policy makers towards taking
measures to enhance the stability of marriages as well as to alleviate the post-separation costs.
1.3
An early strand of literature that followed the pioneering work of Samuelson (1956) and Becker
(1974, Becker 1981) on common preference models of family, omitted the problem of formation
of marriages and only studied strategic considerations within the family. Manser and Brown
(1980) and McElroy and Horney (1981) modelled family demands as an outcome of a bargaining
solution where threat points of agents were taken to be exogenously determined payoffs from
divorce. Although these models on marriage commonly missed one important element, namely, the
matching market, the implications of its absence was neither long unnoticed nor underestimated.
Indeed, Becker (1981) himself emphasized the importance of matching market as a determinant of
wealth distribution between men and women. As he pointed out, wealth distribution within
marriage not only depends on partners' respective contributions to marriage but also on alternative
matches available to each partner in marriage market. The other direction of the interaction
between the formation of marriages and marital (wealth) distribution was later noticed by
Lundberg and Pollak (1993), who argued that policies that transfer income from husbands or wives
affect not only the marital distribution of surplus within existing marriages but also the number of
equilibrium matchings in subsequent marriage markets.
1.4
Recently, there have been studies that model the relationship between marital choice and marital
distribution in a search-theoretic framework. Individuals, in these studies, draw from a distribution
of mates in the marriage market, and decide whether to marry or make further searches. Marriage
is desirable since couples pool their income hence obtain a greater level of consumption.
Moreover, partners learn about the quality of match over time and it is the arrival of new
information that triggers divorce. Couple's decision to end marriage also depends on the prospect
of remarriage. This is introduced into the models by assuming that probability of remarriage is
increasing in the number of singles in the market. The equilibrium marriage and divorce rates, andconsumption allocations are all calculated under rational expectations.
1.5
In the described search-theoretic framework, Bougheas and Georgellis (1999) examined the effect
of divorce costs on both marriage formation and dissolution. Aiyagari et al (2000) constructed an
overlapping generations search model of marriage and divorce, and examined the effects of
antipoverty policies (child support and welfare) on decisions to marry, divorce and invest on
children. Greenwood et al (2003) extended the Aiyagari et al (2000) by endogenizing the family
size. Chiappori and Weiss (2006) studied, in a search-theoretic general equilibrium model of
marriage, the determination of divorce transfers.
1.6
Another strand of literature that combines evolutionary psychology and cognitive sciences studies
mate choice using agent-based computational models. These models specify how individuals meet,
learn over time, and decide about potential partners. The simulation results can be tested against
the observed subjective behaviour, both at an individual and population level (Miller and Todd
1998, Simao and Todd 2002, Simao and Todd 2003 and Todd et al 2007 to name a few.)
1.7
In this paper, we deal with the said problem of marriage formation and marital distribution in a
model of 'matching', differing from and partially improving over both computational mate choice
models and search-theoretic models. Unlike in computational mate choice models, individuals in
our model integrate wealth characteristics of each prospective mate with the other observed
physical and psychological traits (that we simply model in this paper by emotional utilities) to
obtain assessments of overall attractiveness of potential mates. Moreover, we also consider the
issue of marital distribution, which is entirely missing in the agent-based mate choice literature,
not only as a separate issue by itself but also taking into account its calculated implications on the
marital decisions of agents. Differing from both search-theoretic models and computational mate
choice models, agents in our model consider the whole set of mates to be feasible, completely
know the values of all prospective mates, and thus they perfectly decide to whom to propose for
marriage.[3]  Consequently, reaching to a stable matching is always warranted. In search models,
where potential couples meet sequentially at finite rates and the qualities of potential matches are
unknown, individuals draw from a commonly known distribution of mates in the marriage market
and look for a new mate until the costs of an additional search outweigh the benefits that could be
gained by leaving the sampled candidate at hand. In computational mate choice models,
individuals search until they find a prospect whose attractiveness value exceeds a reasonable
aspiration level. Clearly, the matching processes characterized by sequential search decisions under
incomplete information about the values of prospective mates lead to the possibility of
dynamically unstable marriages or courtships in both search models and mate choice models.
1.8
In this paper, individuals' decisions to be unmarried, married, divorced and remarried along with
wealth distribution within the marriage are determined and analyzed in a two-period matching
model through a recursive bargaining process, which is borrowed from Crawford and Rochford
(1986) (hereafter CR). We consider a small economy inhabited by two men and two women living
for two periods.[4]  Each individual is born with an endowment (not necessarily identical) and they
have mate-specific emotional utilities reflecting their affection to each possible match. A match
between a man and a woman produces a surplus that is assumed to be linearly increasing in the
total endowment of the couple. If an individual chooses to stay single then he/she produces a
surplus combining his/her endowment with a single productivity parameter. Marital distribution is
determined via Nash bargaining with the threat point of an individual being given by his/her
bargaining payoff from an alternative mate.[5] 
1.9
Initially no agent is married. At the beginning of each period marriage market opens, allowing
agents to change their marital status. In each period, agents reach to men-optimal stable
matching[6]  and obtain the implied bargaining payoffs using the 'matching with bargaining
equilibrium' of CR. The recursive procedure proposed by CR calculates the disagreement points
for a given pair of agents as the bargaining equilibrium payoffs that they would receive in a
reduced market obtained by setting the match between the pair in consideration unproductive and
letting the match opportunities of all other agents unchanged.[7]
1.10
We assume that agents can divorce at the end of the first period unilaterally, and in such an event
separating partners incur a legal divorce cost and person-specific emotional distress. Moreover,
man is obliged to pay to woman a fraction of his period-one marriage surplus as an alimony.[8] 
Beginning-of-second period endowment of each individual is then determined by his/her period-
one bargaining payoff net of all types of divorce costs (if any).
1.11
Due to the recursive nature of the bargaining equilibrium, the closed-form solution of the problem
cannot be obtained. Thus to make comparative statics, we simulate the model for an artificial
economy. In response to changes in the alimony rate and the legal cost of divorce, we examine the
changes in the payoffs of men, women, and the whole society as well as changes in the
frequencies of being i) single in both periods, ii) married only in the first period, iii) married only
in the second period, iv) married with distinct mates in the two periods, v) married with the same
mate in both periods.
1.12
The organization of the paper is as follows: Section 2 introduces the model. Section 3 presents our
simulation results and relates them to the existing theoretical and empirical literature. Section 4
concludes.
Model
2.1We consider a society with two men m1,m2 and two women w1,w2 living for two periods indexed
by t=1,2. The set of men and women are denoted by M and W, respectively. The set of all possible
feasible assignments of women to men are denoted by M = { μ : W → M | μ is one-to-one}.
2.2
The endowment of agent i (men or women) at the beginning of period t is ei(t), a nonnegative real.
Agent i is born with ei(1); however ei(2) which we call an interim endowment is acquired from
the share of the total marriage surplus at the end of the first period. The emotional utility of agent i
derived from a match with agent j in period t is ui(j,t), a real. The emotional utility of agent i from
being single is normalized to zero, i.e. ui(i,t)=0.
2.3
The marriage market in period t is defined as the complete list of endowments and all utility
possibilities, and denoted by Ωt.
2.4
We assume that the match between man i and woman j converts total endowments into total utility
Eij(t) to be shared (bargained over) through a linear production technology[9], i.e., 
(1)   Eij(t) = fij[ei(t)+ej(t)] 
where the linear productivity parameters are nonegative real numbers and satisfy fij = fji.
2.5
The disagreement point from a match between man i and woman j is (di(j,Ωt),dj(i,Ωt)). In our one-
to-one matching market with transferrable utility, bargaining problems are solved by applying
Nash (1950) solution, which yields to agents equal shares of gains from cooperation.[10]  Thus, the
payoff to agent i when matched with j is
(2)    πi(j;Ωt)=max{biei(t),ui(j,t)+min{Eij(t),(1/2)[Eij(t)+di(j,Ωt)-dj(i,Ωt)]}}
where a nonnegative real number bi denotes the productivity parameter of the linear technology
that converts agent i's endowment into end-of-period utility when he/she is single. Equation (2)
ensures that all the surplus from a marriage is distributed and each agent gets when married at least
as great as when he/she is single.
2.6
Agent i who is matched in period 1 incurs legal divorce cost c, and an emotional distress ci
u at the
end of the period if he/she divorces from his/her mate.[11]  In addition, in the event of divorce,
man is obliged to pay to woman a fraction, a, of his end-of-period 1 marriage surplus (in
endowment terms) as an alimony.
Thus, the period 2 endowment of man i who divorces from woman j at the end of period 1 is 
(3)    ei(2)= (1-a)[πi(j;Ω1) - ui(j,1)]- c
and the period 2 endowment of woman j who divorces from man i at the end of period 1 is[12]  
(4)    ej(2)=πj(i;Ω1) - uj(i,1) +a[πi(j;Ω1) - ui(j,1)]- c. 
2.7
The period 2 emotional utility of agent i who divorces from agent j at the end of period 1 and
considers to be matched with agent k is 
(5)    ui(k,2)=ui(k,1)-ci
u. 
Agent i feels no emotional distress if he/she does not divorce from his/her mate.
2.8
Now, we are ready to define an allocation and bargaining equilibrium in the marriage market.
Here, we will assume that the marriage market Ωt as well as the list ({fi,j}(i,j) є M×W,
{cu
i,bi}i єM∪W, a, c) are common knowledge.[13] 
2.9
An allocation in the marriage market  Ωt consists of a payoff vector x(.,t) and an assignment of
agents μ(.,t), where μ(m,t) є {m} ∪ W for each m є M and μ(w,t) є {w} ∪ M for each w є W.
2.10
Borrowing from CR, we define a bargaining equilibrium for Ωt as an assignment/payoff pair
(μ(.,t),x(.,t)) such that[14]  
(6)    x(m,t)=πm(μ(m,t);Ωt) for all m є M, and  x(w,t)=πw(μ(w,t);Ωt) for all w є W,
(7)  there do not exist agents m є M and w є W such that πm(w;Ωt)>x(m,t) and πw(m;Ωt)>x(w,t). 
2.11
Condition (6) requires that agents matched under μ(,.t) obtain payoffs determined by the bargaining
solution in (2). Condition (7) simply requires that no pair of agents have strict incentives to block
the matching μ(,.t). Together with the bargaining solution in (2), which checks the incentive of
each agent to individually block a given matching, condition (7) defines the stability notion in the
usual way.2.12
To compute the bargaining equilibrium in the marriage market, we will slightly modify recursive
procedure by CR to allow for situations in which agents have emotional utilities. Once agents'
preferences over possible matches are fixed at any stage of this recursive procedure, one can apply
Gale and Shapley's (1962) 'Deferred Acceptance Algorithm' (DAA) to find a stable matching that
is always known to exist (under some mild assumptions on preferences, such as completeness and
transitivity, which are trivially satisfied in our model).[15]  Of the two versions of the DAA, we
employ the DAA with men proposing and obtain the men-optimal stable matching in each step of
the recursive procedure. Below, we first present DAA with men proposing.
2.13
DAA with Men Proposing: In the DAA with men proposing, initially nobody is engaged
(assigned) or rejected. In each iteration, an unassigned man proposes to the first acceptable woman
on his list that he has not proposed to yet. A woman who receives a proposal that she prefers to
her current assignment accepts it and rejects her current assignment. The algorithm stops after any
step in which every man has either been rejected by every acceptable women on his list or is
engaged to an acceptable woman. (By interchanging the names of men and women, the DAA with
men proposing simply changes to the DAA with women proposing.)
2.14
The modified CR procedure for finding the bargaining equilibrium in the marriage market in a
given period is simply described below. (A lengthier version of the procedure is also available at
the Appendix.)
2.15
Possible marriages in a society, involving two men and two women, are denoted by the pairs
p1=(m1,w1), p2=(m1,w2), p3=(m2,w1), p4=(m2,w2). We define the set P={p1,p2,p3,p4}. For any
subset F of P, let Ωt[F] be the restriction of Ωt on F. Clearly, Ωt[P]=Ωt.
2.16
Below, we introduce a recursive procedure, called CR(F;Ωt[F]), which will compute the period-t
equilibrium payoffs for each marriage in F using the endowment and utility information in Ωt[F].
Apparently, CR(P;Ωt) will compute the period-t equilibrium in our described marriage market.
Procedure CR(F,Ωt[F]):
Step 1: Pick any match p=(m,w) є F. We construct the reduced market Ω't[F] from Ωt[F] by
setting the match p as unproductive, i.e. 
(8)    πm(w;Ω't[F])=bmem(t) and  πw(m;Ω't[F])=bwew(t) 
and letting Ω't[F]=Ωt[F] for all pairs in F\{p}.
Step 2: Using payoffs for p assumed in Step 1 and computed equilibrium payoffs
CR(F\{p},Ωt[F\{p}]) for the marriages in F\{p}, compute the men-optimal stable matching and the
implied payoff structure x'(.,t) for Ω't[F].[16]  
Step 3: Set the disagreement payoffs of spouses in p to their payoffs calculated in Step 2, i.e., 
(9)    dm(w;Ωt[F])=x'(m,t)-um(w,t)  and  dw(m;Ωt[F])=x'(w,t)-uw(m,t).
By conditions (8) and (9), the threat points of the pair (m,w) in the market Ωt[F] are taken as their
equilibrium payoffs in the reduced market Ω't[F] (net of the emotional utilities from their current
mates), where they are forced to remain single while all other agents can still exploit all of their
opportunities.
Step 4: Compute equilibrium payoffs of p using the Marriage rule.
Marriage Rule: For the agents forming a given pair, calculate the bargaining payoffs using
equation (2). Divorce the agents if and only if at least one of the agents is not worse off by
remaining single. In that case, assign to both agents in the pair the payoffs from being single.
Step 5: Repeat steps 1-4 for each match p in F.
Step 6: Using payoffs for each p in F as calculated in Step 4, compute the men-optimal stable
matching and the implied payoffs for each match in F.
2.17
Having described our model and our marital equilibrium procedure, we can now summarize the
functioning of our simple marriage economy involving 2 men and 2 women. In period 1, a
marriage market opens and all agents participate. The stable matchings are determined via Gale
and Shapley's men-proposing DAA. However, one gender's rankings of the other is endogenously
determined within the model. The recursive CR procedure computes stable matchings for an
economy through finding the implied preferences of the agents based on their bargaining share
from the potential marital surplus. The bargaining share of an agent depends on his/her threat point
(that is his/her share from an alternative mate), which in turn depends on the order in which a man
proposes to a woman. For every individual, starting with a market containing an arbitrary couple,
the threat point is calculated recursively as his/her equilibrium payoff to a stable match (which
may include the prospect of being single as well) that will be obtained as the market includes more
participants, of both gender, for all combinations of new arrivals. In the second period, all
marriages are artificially dissolved and the CR procedure is applied to the new economy with the
updated endowment vector. Those individuals who are matched with their first period mates are
considered to be married to the same partner for their lifetime. Others either switch mates orconsidered to be married to the same partner for their lifetime. Others either switch mates or
change their marital status from being married to single or vice versa.
Simulation Results
3.1
Using the GAUSS (version 6.0) we simulated the model for an artificial economy involving two
men and two women. (The program codes and the simulated data are available from the authors
upon request.) The parameter values are listed in Table 1. The numbers in curly brackets are the
common set of values that the parameters just above them take.
Table 1: Parameter values
 Tastes
 um1(w1,1), um1(w2,1), um2(w1,1), um2(w2,1)
 { 0.28, 0.59, 0.94, 1.31, 1.72, 2.15, 2.62} 
 uw1(m1,1), uw1(m2,1), uw2(m1,1), uw2(m2,1) 






 {0.39, 0.49, 0.60, 0.70, 0.81, 0.9, 1.02} 
 Endowments
 em1(1), em2(1), ew1(1), ew2(1)
 {1.04, 2.64, 4.80, 7.51, 10.78, 14.60, 18.98} 
 Productivity
parameters
 fm1w1, fm1w2, fm2w1, fm2w2
 {0.50, 0.75, 1.00, 1.25, 1.50, 1.75, 2.00}
 bm1, bm2, bw1, bw2
 {0.44, 0.66, 0.87, 1.09, 1.30, 1.52, 1.73}
 Policy variables  a, c
 {0.13, 0.25, 0.38, 0.50, 0.63, 0.75, 0.88}
3.2
The model involves 26 parameters each of which admits 7 distinct values. Out of 726 possible
simulations, we have chosen a total of 2401 to run due to CPU constraints of our computing
machine. The data set which can be reported in a spreadsheet involving 2401 data rows for 26
parameter columns has the following pattern: For any parameter x which takes seven ascending
values in {x1,x2,...,x7}, there exists a frequency value kx such that in data column for parameter x,
the first kx rows contain x1, the next kx rows contain x2, ..., the seventh kx rows contain x7. The
first 7kx rows of data column for x repeat themselves 2401/(7kx) times as a whole. The below
table reports the frequency value kx for each model parameter x. (Parameters in the first row have
the frequency value 343, while those in the last row have the frequency value 1.)
Table 2: Frequency values of parameters in datasheet
 343    um1(w1,1),   uw2(m2,1),   cu
m1,   em1(1),    fm1w1,   bm1,   c
49    um1(w2,1),   uw1(m2,1),   cu
m2,   em2(1),   fm1w2,   bm2   
7    um2(w1,1),   uw2(m1,1),   cu
w1,   ew1(1),   fm2w1,   bw1   
1    um2(w2,1),   uw1(m1,1),   cu
w2,   ew2(1),   fm2w2,   bw2,   a
3.3
The single and couple productivity parameters take artificial values which are above, below, and
equal to, 'one' to allow for all distinct cases of constant returns to scale. Couple productivity
parameters take, on average, higher values than single productivity parameters, in line with the
recent empirical finding of Zagorsky (2005).[17]  The rest of the model parameters are artificially
chosen to yield a set of equilibria involving diverse marital decisions.
For the model parameters a and c we shall below analyze the variation in the average values (using
343 observations for each value of these two input variables) of the output variables in the list
( x(M,2),  x(W,2),  x(MW,2),  M(ss),  M(sm),  M(ms),  M(mm-c),  M(mm-n),  W(ss),  W(sm), 
W(ms),  W(mm-c),  W(mm-n),  MW(ss),  MW(sm),  MW(ms),  MW(mm-c),  MW(mm-n) ) . Here,
x(M,2), x(W,2), and x(MW,2) are respectively the total payoffs of men, women, and the whole
society, in the second period, while for any group Z in {M,W,MW} (men, women, society) the
output variables Z(ss),Z(sm), Z(ms),Z(mm-c),Z(mm-n) respectively denote the frequencies of 
'being single in both periods, married only in the second period, married only in the first period,
married with distinct mates in the two periods, married with the same mate in both periods'. Weshould note that M(mm-n) and W(mm-n), and hence MW(mm-n), always take the same values.
3.4
The marital status of the population for the simulated sample is exhibited in Table 3. The
percentage of divorced couples, MW(ms)+MW(mm-c), is 23.28%, while 27% of these couples
remarry after divorce. Calculating MW(mm-n)/ [MW(mm-n)+MW(mm-c)] shows that 89% of the
marriages are stable. Moreover, as should be evident from MW(sm)/[MW(ss)+MW(sm)],
approximately 10% out of the first-period singles get married in period two.[18]
Table 3: Marital status (percentage distribution)

































Figures 1-6 exhibit comparative static results with respect to the alimony rate. In Figure 1, the
women's payoff is increasing and men's payoff is decreasing, while the overall payoff is slightly
decreasing. In Figure 2, the frequency of being single in both periods declines for both genders
except for a pike around 0.35. In contrast, the frequency of being married only in the second period
is rising in Figure 3 for both men and women except for a slight dip around 0.4. The frequencies of
being married only in the first period are escalating in Figure 4 up to 0.75. However, Figure 5
shows that the frequencies of being married to different partners in the two periods are fluctuating
with a steep upward trend. The sum of the two, which is the frequency of divorce, is also
increasing. Finally, the frequency of being married to the same partner in both periods falls for
each gender, as plotted in Figure 6.
Figure 1 Figure 2
Figure 3 Figure 4Figure 5 Figure 6
3.6
The above results are also summarized in Table 4.
Table 4: Summary of the effects of an increase in alimony rate (a)
(+=  increasing;   - = decreasing;    ~ = fluctuations)
Men  Women Society
 Payoffs - + - (slightly)
 Frequencies
 Single-Single - with ~ - with ~ - with ~
 Single-Married + with ~ + with ~ + with ~
 Married-Single + with ~ + with ~ + with ~
 Married-Married (Distinct Mates) + with ~ + with ~ + with ~
 Married-Married (Same Mate) - - -
3.7
The intuition underlying the above observations is that a higher alimony rate implies higher post-
divorce financial wealth for a woman married during the first period. A wealthier divorced woman
may now be able to seek a more profitable marriage with a wealthier man who did not find that
particular woman admissible at the beginning of the first period.[19]  Or it may even be the case
that a divorced woman with sufficiently high earnings from divorce proceedings may no longer
find any man (equivalently any marriage) desirable (profitable) in the second period and may
choose to become single.[20]   The divorce decisions of married women clearly imply a change in
the marital status of their initial spouses as well as their prospective spouses, if any.
3.8
One can also interpret the parameter a as the child support benefit paid to the custodian partner,
which happens to be women in our model. Then, our model predicts that child support has positive
effects both on the rate of marriage and on the rate of divorce. While the former is in line with, the
latter contrasts with, Aiyagari et al (2000). However, in the same context, Greenwood et al (2003)
finds small effects of child support on the equilibrium number of marriages.Figure 7 Figure 8
Figure 9 Figure 10
Figure 11 Figure 12
3.9
The effects of legal cost of divorce on the model outcomes are presented in Figures 7-12. Since the
cost parameter c takes values relatively low with respect to the magnitudes of endowments, its
direct effect on the payoffs of separating couples is already expected to be small. The almost
horizontal behavior of payoffs in Figure 7 reveals that the indirect effects of c, due to changed
marriage opportunities by the changed endowment structure, must also have been negligibly small.
The divorce frequencies fluctuate on a relatively wider band with respect to the changes in the
legal cost of divorce and reach maxima around 0.5 in Figure 10, while at this very level, the
frequencies of continuing marriages attain their minimum in Figure 12. Figures 8, 9, and 11
respectively show that the frequencies of remaining always single, getting married after the first
period, and changing the spouse in the second period are all fluctuating in narrow bands, for both
men and women, in response to changes in the legal cost of divorce.
3.10
The above results are also summarized in Table 5.
Table 5: Summary of the effects of an increase in cost of divorce (a)
(~ = fluctuations)
Men  Women Society
Payoffs ~ (small) ~ (small) ~ (small)
 Frequencies
 Single-Single ~ (small) ~ (small) ~ (small)
 Single-Married ~ (small) ~ (small) ~ (small)
 Married-Single ~ (large) ~ (large) ~ (large)
 Married-Married (Distinct Mates) ~ (small) ~ (small) ~ (small)
 Married-Married (Same Mate) ~ (large) ~ (large) ~ (large)On the effect of divorce cost on the marital decisions, Becker (1976) argued that when divorce
becomes easier, the number of people who are legally married may actually increase, which is only
partially supported by our findings (Figures 9 and 11). However, empirical studies examining the
impact of changing divorce legislation on marital status are also conflicting.[21] While Peters
(1986, 1992) find no significant impact of changing divorce laws on divorce rates, Allen (1992)
and Friedberg (1998) refute her finding. Recently, Wolfers (2006) reports that the divorce rate rose
sharply following the adoption of unilateral divorce laws, but this rise was reversed within about a
decade hence the long-run effects are ambiguous. Brien et al (2006) finds that decrease in divorce
cost leads to a slight increase in the rate of marriage.
3.11
We should note that the diverse range of empirical results listed above are in fact not invalidated
by our simulations in Figures 7-12. The reason why our model predicts fluctuations rather than
monotone changes in the marital decisions of agents with regard to a rise in the legal cost of
divorce is the heterogeneity of wealth within the society. A change in the legal cost of divorce
redefines the relative wealth levels of the married, divorced as well as single agents. A rise in the
divorce cost obviously reduces the relative bargaining power (wealth) of a divorced agent in
seeking marriage, but whether this would consequently lead to an increase or decrease in the
admissibility/desirability of a divorced agent from the viewpoint of agents from the opposite
gender entirely depends on the distribution of the accumulated wealth in the society at the end of
the first period. With a higher level of divorce cost, a divorced agent whose post-divorce wealth
has been reduced to a moderate level may suddenly become a prospective spouse that is financially
desirable in the second period at least for some divorced or single agents with moderate wealth,
whereas an agent who has been divorced and been rendered extremely poor by the raised costs of
separation may indeed become wholly undesirable as a spouse and hence be forced to become
single in the second period.[22] 
Conclusion
4.1
In this paper, we have introduced a two-period optimization model to study the issues of marriage
formation and marital dissolution using the recursive solution procedure proposed by Crawford
and Rochford (1986) for the problem of matching under cooperative bargaining.
4.2
We have simulated our model for an artificial set of parameters to examine the effects of the rates
of alimony and legal cost of divorce on the marital status of agents in the society as well as on
their marital payoffs. Our findings show that a higher rate of alimony to women is increasing not
only the post-divorce payoffs of women (at the expense of a reduction in men's post-divorce
payoffs) but also the divorce rate, albeit with some minor fluctuations. Moreover, we show that
even small changes in the divorce cost, which yield hardly visible effects on the post-divorce
distribution of wealth in the society, may lead to rather significant fluctuations in the marital status
of both men and women. We believe that the observed unstable dependence between the marital
decisions and the cost of divorce, which we argue is entirely generated by the heterogeneity of the
optimizing agents with regard to their initial endowments, may indeed help to explain a diverse
range of conflicting empirical results in the existing literature of marriage.
4.3
Differing from the existing search-theoretic literature that has emphasized the random nature of
meeting a potential mate, our paper is indeed a first attempt to model the formation of marriage
and marital dissolution by the use of optimization in a completely deterministic matching
framework. We should admit that the pool of feasible mates for each individual may in reality
expand over time by controlled as well as uncontrolled entrances of new candidates, i.e. the
formation of mate pools is to some extent random in nature. However, it is hardly acceptable that
individuals determine their prospective partners by random draws from any given pool of feasible
mates. Instead, individuals make pairwise comparisons within the pool and form (usually short)
preference lists, according to which they make sequential proposals for marriage. The interaction
of the separate decisions of individuals on the opposite sides of the marriage market then
determines the equilibrium matches. In this respect, while both search-theoretic models and the
matching model we develop here have their own uses and strengths, a more complete framework
of a marriage market can, of course, integrate the two, taking also into consideration the potential
benefits of non-cooperative versus cooperative bargaining in simultaneously resolving the marital
distribution and determining the marital choice.[23] 
 Appendix
A.1
This Appendix contains the procedure of finding the bargaining equilibrium in a given period.
Step 1:  Pick a permutation {pi,pj,pk,pl} of the pairs p1=(m1,w1), p2=(m1,w2), p3=(m2,w1),
p4=(m2,w2).
Step 2:  For the agents forming the pair pl, set the disagreement points equal to the payoffs from
being single and calculate the bargaining payoffs using the Marriage Rule. Next, for the agents
entering both pk and pl set the disagreement points to their calculated bargaining payoffs in the pair
pl, and for the remaining agents in pk set the disagreement points to the payoffs from being single.
Then, as the outcome of this step, determine the marital status and bargaining payoffs of the pair
pk using the Marriage Rule.Step 3:  Repeat step 2 by interchanging the roles of pl and pk, and obtain the marital status and
bargaining payoffs of the pair pl.
Step 4:  Using the bargaining allocation obtained for pk and pl in steps 2 and 3, respectively, find
the men-optimal stable matching for the agents in pk U pl.
Step 5:  For the agents in pj, set the disagreement points to the bargaining payoffs obtained under
the stable matching calculated in step 4 if these agents are also in pk or pl, and otherwise set them
to the payoffs from being single. Then, find the marital status and payoffs for the pair pj using the
Marriage Rule.
Step 6:  Repeat steps 2-5 consecutively for the permutations (pi,pk,pj,pl) and (pi,pl,pj,pk), and
obtain the marital status and payoffs of the pairs pk and pl, respectively.
Step 7:  Let the pair pi be unproductive and the agents in pi have their payoffs from being single.
Step 8:  Using the marital status and payoffs assumed or calculated for pi, pj, pk, and pl in steps 2-
7, find the men-optimal stable matching and the implied payoffs.
Step 9:  For the agents in pi, set the disagreement points to their bargaining payoffs calculated in
step 8. Next, find the marital status and bargaining payoffs of the pair pi using the Marriage Rule.
Step 10:  Repeat steps 2-9 consecutively for the permutations (pj,pi,pk,pl), (pk,pi,pj,pl), (pl,pi,pj,pk),
and obtain the marital status and bargaining payoffs for the pairs pj, pk, and pl, respectively. Step
11:  Using the marital status and bargaining payoffs calculated for the pairs pi, pj,pk, and pl,
determine the men-optimal stable matching (hence the bargaining equilibrium) for the marriage
market.
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Notes
1Stevenson and Wolfers (2007) reports that in the United States over the last 150 years divorce
rates have risen with a rate of 3.6 divorces per thousand people and 16.7 divorces per thousand
married couples by 2005.
2McLanahan and Sandefur (1994) reports that, in 1995, the median income for female headed
families with children was about one-third of the median income for married couple with children.
Moreover, the rates to drop out of high school, to be idle, to experience teen births and not to take
college education are higher for children living in single-parent households than for children from
two-parent families. Page and Stevens (2002) finds that in the long-run (six or more years after the
most recent divorce) family income falls by 40 to 45% after divorce, and food consumption is
reduced by 17%.
3Of course, these assumptions make more sense in matching environments with a small population
size.
4Each gender is restricted to have two representatives and live for two periods only to reduce the
excessive number of calculations required to compute the recursive marriage equilibrium at each
run of 2401 model simulations, which we will deal with in Section 3.
5 In the two-person cooperative bargaining literature, a bargaining problem consists of a convex
and comprehensive set in the Cartesian plane of utilities and a particular point (disagreement point
or threat point) in this set denoting the payoffs that the two agents will receive in case of
disagreement. Bargaining solution is any procedure that computes the agreement point for each
possible bargaining problem. In our model, we employ the Nash bargaining solution that
maximizes the product of the individual utilities net of the disagreement payoffs (given
exogenously or determined by outside options).
6We say that a matching is stable if no married individual prefers being single to his or her mate
and if no pair of (unmatched) man and woman prefer each other to their mates, if any. A stable
matching is called men-optimal if there exists no other stable matching which makes at least one
man better-off (in terms of his mate) without making any other man in the society worse-off.
7Bargaining equilibrium of CR is criticized for having a drawback that an agent's utility obtained
from his or her original marriage cannot affect his or her utility in an alternative marriage. As a
remedy, Bennett (1988) proposes a new bargaining equilibrium, which always yields a core
matching that is Pareto optimal and maximizes aggregate utility. However, this alternative solution
rests upon much stronger behavioral assumptions about players, who must always be consistent inrests upon much stronger behavioral assumptions about players, who must always be consistent in
their conjectures and able to solve fixed point problems. While Bennett's bargaining equilibrium is
uniquely appealing in the design and implementation of matching algorithms for a market designer
who can rationally act on behalf of agents of any degree of rationality, the appropriate choice
between the two equilibrium definitions by CR and Bennett in modelling the observed marital
behavior in a particular society cannot be determined independently from the investigated
rationality of the involved agents. In this paper, we prefer to use computationally more tractable
equilibrium of CR for our simulations, consciously assuming away the full consistency of agents in
the marriage market.
8According to McManus and DiPrete (2001), noncustodial parents are overwhelmingly male and
alimony payments almost exclusively flow from men to women.
9Output (total utility) produced by a single-factor linear production technology is just a multiple or
a fraction of the used factor (total endowments).
10The Nash solution (si,sj), where si=(1/2)[Eij(t)+ di(j,Ωt)- dj(i,Ωt)] and sj=(1/2)[Eij(t)+ dj(i,Ωt)-
di(j,Ωt)], maximizes the product [si- di(j,Ωt)][sj- dj(i,Ωt)] subject to si + sj=Eij(t).
11Here, we assumed for simplicity that the spouses share the divorce court expense of amount 2c
and each spouse experiences emotional distress caused by divorce irrespective of who initiates
divorce proceedings. These assumptions are less restrictive, of course, when the said cost
parameters also represent material and psychological costs of moving to a new place to live.
12In equations 3 and 4 defining post-divorce wealth respectively for man i and woman j, emotional
utilities are first subtracted from the payoffs in calculating alimonies to be received or paid since
these utilities do not add to the total physical endowment that grows during the marriage of i and j
in period 1.
13The stated common knowledge assumption, which is essential for the computability of the
'actual' bargaining equilibrium is definitely more demanding in marriage markets with a larger
number of individuals. However, in situations where this informational assumption is not
appealing, one can further assume that individuals will appeal to a Bayesian bargaining
equilibrium which, of course, requires the use of commonly known priors on the defined structures
of a marriage market.
14In fact, our two-period model also allows one to define and use a 'dynamic' equilibrium
considering the life-time payoffs in individuals' decision problems. In such an equilibrium, a pair
of poor agents that have extremely strong affections to each other may rather marry with rich and
otherwise 'unattractive' individuals in the first period for the sole purpose of fortune-hunting
(wealth-accumulating), and then they may divorce and marry with their 'genuine lovers' in the
second period. In this paper, we assume away such far-sighted opportunistic motives, and use the
single-shot equilibrium notion of CR in every period of our model.
15Gale and Shapley's (1962) DAA has been used to characterize group-optimal stable matchings in
many market design problems, involving hospital-intern matching, college admissions and school
choice.
16Using the bargaining payoff from an alternative mate as the threat point in marital bargaining, it
is very convenient that for each potential partner, there is exactly one alternative match for each
man and woman. This also works in an n-person generalization of the model since step 2 of the
above procedure is recursively called until the set F shrinks to contain only two pairs.
17Using US data from the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth (NLSY79), Zagorsky (2005)
finds that for respondents who married and stay married, per person net worth was 93 per cent
higher than for single respondents.
18Coincidentally, the characteristics of our sample in terms of marital distribution fit quite well
with the latest U.S. demographic data. According to U.S. Census Bureau, the marital status of
people 15 years or over for all races as of March 2005 is reported as follows: 17.7% of the
population is separated, divorced or widowed; 29% is never married, while 53.2% is married. The
three figures are respectively 16.99%, 23.87% and 59.14% according to our simulations
summarized in Table 3.
19Clearly, the above argument that a rise in the alimony rate increases the likelihood of remarrying
after divorce has more support in bigger populations involving more than four individuals due to,
on average, increased diversity in endowments and utilities.
20We have assumed that the couple productivity is, on the average, higher than the individual
productivity. However, the produced output of each marriage (after being adjusted with respect to
the outside options of the couples) is equally shared between the spouses. Thus, marrying may not
be financially desirable for some wealthy individuals unless of course their prospective spouses are
also sufficiently rich. We should also note that the intuition underlying why some individuals may
choose to become single after divorce with big alimony payments is surely weaker in larger and
more diverse societies where almost everyone faces financially attractive prospective mates at
almost all wealth levels.
21The relaxation of divorce laws across many U.S. states during 1970s and 1980s reduced the legal
cost of divorce substantially (see Brien et al 2006).22Obviously, increases in the size and diversity of population in the marriage market strengthen the
former argument while weakening the latter.
23For a non-cooperative model of marriage, see Lundberg and Pollak (1994, 1996).
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